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    Abstract 
    The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) framework 
introduced by the World Bank and the IMF at the turn of the century goes 
well beyond the mainly macroeconomic conditionalities of the structural ad-
justment era by requesting that civil society participates in the preparation 
and the implementation of the strategy. Although constituting a signiﬁcant 
shift in the international ﬁnancial institutions’ discourse, the difference in the 
way in which the traditional and the “participation” conditions are scrutinized 
for compliance, considerably reduces the compulsory nature of the latter con-
ditionality. Whereas clear standards and criteria are developed to evaluate 
compliance with the economic conditionalities, such standards seem to be 
lacking in the case of participation.  This paper reviews the evaluation of the 
civil society participation in PRSP documents by the Joint Staff of the World 
Bank and the IMF.  This desk-based study of 35 Joint Staff Assessments 
(JSAs) ﬁnds these JSAs to lack both clarity and candour. 
The author would like to thank Nadia Molenaers, Robrecht Renard and Nathalie Holvoet for their usefull 
comments and suggestions.  Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author. 
  Résumé
    Le plan échafaudé dans leur Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSP) (à savoir : leurs articles traitant d’une stratégie de réduction de la 
pauvreté) par la Banque mondiale et le FMI au tournant du siècle va bien 
au-delà des mises sous conditions, essentiellement macroéconomiques, de 
l’ère de l’ajustement structurel en demandant que la société civile participe 
à la préparation et à la mise en oeuvre de la stratégie en question. Quoique 
constituant un renversement signiﬁcatif dans le discours des institutions ﬁ-
nancières internationales, la différence dans la façon dont les conditions tradi-
tionnelles et de « participation » sont minutieusement examinées pour voir si 
elles sont conformes, réduit considérablement le caractère contraignant de ces 
dernières. Alors que des modèles standards et des critères clairs sont établis 
pour évaluer la conformité avec les mises sous conditions économiques, de 
tels modèles et critères semblent manquer dans le cas de la participation. Le 
présent article passe en revue l’évaluation de la participation de la société 
civile dans les documents PRSP par le Joint Staff de la Banque mondiale et 
du FMI (à savoir : une équipe regroupant des représentants de ces deux insti-
tutions). Cette étude des textes de 35 évaluations du Joint Staff en question 
montre que celles-ci manquent à la fois de clarté et d’impartialité.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06 • 5
  Introduction 
    The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers were designed to rec-
tify the ﬂaws of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs).  Whereas the SAPs 
focussed on macro-economic and monetary stability and economic growth, 
thereby imposing a host of economic reform measures as a condition for ﬁ-
nancial support, a new discourse is now being used.  In order to receive debt 
relief under the enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC-II) initia-
tive, a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper must be drawn up, which is country-
grown, genuinely “owned” by government and citizens, and pro-poor in focus 
(IMF, 2004).  Partly under the pressure from ever more active and powerful 
NGO lobbying, “civil society participation”, “accountability” and “owner-
ship” became the new buzz words.  This new emphasis does not replace the 
“classic” economic conditions, but is rather meant to make their implementa-
tion more likely. However, although central in the new IFI discourse, there 
is a striking difference in the way in which the participation conditionality is 
being scrutunized for compliance, compared to the economic conditions. This 
is revealing of the genuine importance attached to civil society participation 
by the IFIs themselves.  Whereas clear standards and criteria are applied to 
evaluate compliance with the economic conditionalities, those standards seem 
to be lacking for the participation conditionality.  Two independent reviews of 
the PRSP process, one by the IMF and one by the World Bank, both uttered 
harsh criticisms with regard to the Joint Staff Assessments of the participation 
processes in the formulation of PRSPs (IEO, 2004 & OED, 2004).  Three 
main concerns can be distinguished. First, the JSAs are said to be unclear: 
there are no evaluation procedures speciﬁed in advance, nor is it clear whether 
all PRSPs are scrutinized according to the same criteria.  A second critique 
reproaches the JSAs that they are not extensively known or used, except for 
a small circle of IFI insiders, notwithstanding that one of the main goals of 
the Joint Staff Assessments is to inform donors and the public at large. Fi-
nally, both evaluations found the JSAs to lack the necessary ‘candour’.  Local 
stakeholders, if they are familiar with the JSA, ﬁnd them to paint an overly 
favourable picture, particularly with regard to the assessment of participatory 
processes. The purpose of this paper is to provide a more systematic analysis 
of the quality of the assessment of the participation processes in the JSA docu-
ments. The questions raised in this paper are based on the critisims of the inde-
pendent reviews on JSAs of participation processes; namely the clarity of the 
questions at hand and the criteria with which to answer them, the “candour” 
of the assessments and the causes behind any possible reluctance of the evalu-
ators to critically scrutinise the participation processes.  A third element will 
be added by checking for possible variations over time in the way evaluations 
are conducted (criteria, clarity etc.).
In postulating our research hypothesis we started from the widely ac-
knowledged fact that the quality of civil society participation in preparing the 
PRSP has differed considerably across countries. We postulate that although 
such variation will partly reﬂect random effects and local idiosyncracies, and 6 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06
indeed reﬂect the difference in the success of the participation conditionality 
itself, it would be highly unlikely if differences across countries would not to 
some extent also reﬂect the difference in the pre-existing quality of the politi-
cal system and civil society involvement. On this basis we expected to ﬁnd at 
least some correlation between the quality of the participation reported in the 
JSAs and certain structural political variables of the country in question. We 
did not ﬁnd any such correlation in our desk study, and we suggest that this 
testiﬁes to the poor quality of the JSA assessments. 
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1.  The Joint Staff Assessments and the
  Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative
    The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund launched a 
new initiative to improve the effectiveness of the development aid in reducing 
poverty in 1999, namely the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The idea of 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper originated from the discussions, which 
led up to the formulation of the Enhanced Heavily Endebted Poor Countries 
Initiative. The Enhanced HIPC framework came into being under pressure 
of international ngos, academics and donors to make the link between debt 
relief and poverty reduction explicit, whereas this was not the case in the 
original HIPC framework. Although the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
were conceptualized as framework for the enhanced HIPC, they were soon 
seen as an overarching country-level policy document (Piron & Evans, 2004). 
The PRSP approach was inspired by the will to learn from the failures of 
previous development programmes. Often stated as among the main causes 
of the failures of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) are the lack 
of national ownership, governance dysfunctions and weak public expenditure 
management (OED, 2002). Therefore some of these issues were taken into 
account when elaborating the PRS Initiative. The PRS initiative was based 
on the same principles as the Comprehensive Development Framework and 
as such could be perceived as an operationalisation of those principles. These 
ﬁve principles are: country-driven, result-focused, long-term, comprehensive 
and partnership-oriented (World Bank, 2003). The ﬁrst principle states that 
the PRS process should be country-driven involving a broad-based partici-
pation. Furthermore, the result-oriented PRS process should be focused on 
outcomes that beneﬁt the poor and be comprehensive in that it recognises the 
multidimensional nature of poverty and is comprehensive in the proposed 
policy responses. Moreover the partnership-principle requires coordinated 
participation of development partners.  Finally, all the above principles should 
result in a strategy that is based on a long-term perspective for poverty reduc-
tion (IMF, 2004). These core-principles of the PRS approach prove that the 
new framework was intended to increase country ownership, enhance the 
poverty focus of the country programmes and strengthen the collaboration 
between donors in supporting country efforts. An important part of the PRS 
architecture is the Joint Staff Assessment.  This document is drawn up jointly 
by the staff from the World Bank and the IMF, since it was believed that “dis-
sociating the PRS into developmental and a macro-economic component, and 
evaluating these separately, would be illogical, seeing as they would succeed 
or fail together” (IMF, 2004, p37).  The Joint Staff assessment (JSA) evaluates 
the strengths and the weaknesses of a country’s PRSP. It provides the Bretton 
Woods Institutions with an overall assessment by considering whether the 
PRSP provides a sound basis for concessional assistance for HIPC debt relief.   
Guidelines have been formulated indicating that “, although the speciﬁc con-
tent of PRSPs will vary widely among countries, a PRSP will include four core 
elements: (a) a description of the country’s participatory process; (b) poverty 
diagnosis; (c) targets, indicators, and monitoring systems; and (d) priority 8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06
public actions.” The guidelines then go on to specify that the assessment 
should attempt to succinctly answer the key questions related to each of those 
four core elements, giving the greatest weight to the priority public actions 
and to the arrangements for monitoring and evaluation of the PRS imple-
mentation.  Furthermore due regard should be given to the country’s starting 
point (World Bank, s.d.). We will go into further detail regarding the speciﬁc 
questions speciﬁed in the JSA guidelines later on in the paper, but ﬁrst we will 
zoom in on the rationale behind the conceptualisation of the JSAs.
The Joint Staff Assessment was designed to fulﬁll three functions.   
Firstly it was meant to provide feedback to the governments of the recipient 
countries and other domestic stakeholders of the weaknesses and strengths of 
the PRS, as perceived by the joint staff (feedback and outreach function). This 
information can be helpful in determining how to improve the effectiveness 
of their efforts in reducing poverty.  Secondly, the JSA should also provide 
input necessary for the executives of the World Bank and IMF to decide upon 
concessional support (internal governance function).   Finally, these reviews 
could prove to be useful for other donors to adjust their development policies 
to the assessments provided by the joint staff (partnership function).  The JSA 
signals to the donor community whether or not, in the view of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions, this particular country is found worthy of support and 
what are the main weaknesses or strengths to take into account.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06 • 9
2.  The evaluations of the Joint Staff Assessments by  
    the independent evaluation ofﬁces of both
  IMF (IEO) and World Bank (OED)1.
    Recently, the independent evaluation departments of both the 
World Bank (OED) and the International Monetary Fund (IEO) conducted 
an evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative.  These evaluations 
both included a review of the Joint Staff Assessments.  Both institutions did 
a part of the evaluation jointly.  Another part was done separately2.  Both 
institutions were highly critical regarding the effectiveness of the current for-
mat of the joint staff assessments.  First a number of general shortcomings 
resulting from these evaluations will be brieﬂy reviewed.  Subsequently, the 
speciﬁc constraints concerning the assessment of the participation process 
will be presented.  
Both reports list a number of general weaknesses of the JSAs.  First, 
public awareness of the JSAs is restricted to a small circle of government of-
ﬁcials, thereby reducing the possible usefulness for donors, recipient govern-
ments as well as the public at large.  As was stated earlier, one of the main 
functions of the JSA was to provide feedback to domestic stakeholders. The 
JSAs fail to fulﬁll this function. As is stated in the report of the Independent 
Evaluation Ofﬁce: Although all the JSAs are in the public domain…
“It is not clear that JSAs are de facto widely available.  This is in part 
because the BWIs themselves typically do not make them available on their 
websites in languages other than English, and in part because active dissemi-
nation on the ground largely rests on the authorities.  Our case studies sug-
gest that in most countries civil society stakeholders-along with a number of 
government representatives-are unaware of the JSAs” (IMF, 2004, p 42)
Moreover, even donors do not rely on JSAs as was foreseen at its con-
ception.  The independent evaluation found that acceptance of the JSA in 
the role of a common reference for donors is limited.  In several case studies 
donors were found to question the clarity and the candour of the assessments 
as well as regretting the lack of inclusion of the views of donors outside of the 
Bretton Woods Institutions.  
Secondly, both institutions criticize the direct link between the lending 
modalities of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the Joint Staff Assessment.   
The fact that a positive assessment by the joint staff is a conditio sine qua non 
for HIPC debt relief in fact forces the staff to, no matter what the perform-
ance of the country, come up with a positive sum at the end.  This effectively 
reduces the space for candid evaluation.
 “The clarity, candour and comprehensiveness of the assessment is 
uneven […] this partly reﬂects a built-in bias to reach a “yes or no” sig-
nal- which is always yes in practice, encapsulated in standardised language.” 
(IMF, 2004, p9)
1  The  Independent  Evaluation 
Ofﬁce  (IEO)  is  the  independent 
evaluation unit of the international 
Monetary  Fund.   The  Operations 
Evaluation  Department  (OED)  is 
the  evaluation  unit  of  the World 
Bank.
2  The  evaluations  are  based  on 
workshops, desk-based studies and 
case studies (surveys, focus group 
sessions and in-country stakehold-
er  surveys).   Ten  countries  were 
selected  as  case  studies,  reﬂect-
ing  a  variation  in  both  economic 
situation, human development, geo-
graphical dispersion and progress in 
the prsp process.  Four countries 
were assessed jointly by staff from 
IMF and World Bank (Mozambique, 
Nicaragua,  Tajikistan  &  Tanzania).   
The IEO conducted its own analy-
sis on two more countries (Guinea 
and Vietnam).  OED collected data 
on Albania, Cambodia, Ethiopia and 
Mauritania.  10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06
Furthermore the evaluation departments conclude that the JSAs suffer 
from large differences among assessments in analytical quality as well as an 
insufﬁcient focus on the in-country processes rather than on the quality of the 
documents such.  
The evaluations go further into detail regarding some particular issues 
which the assessments touch upon.  We will limit ourselves to the partici-
pation process.  The World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (OED) 
ascertain that in nine out of the ten case studies the factual treatment of the 
participatory processes by the joint staff was overly optimistic or incomplete 
regarding the value and the contribution of the participatory process. Similar-
ly, the Independent Evaluation Ofﬁce of the IMF (IEO) deplores the fact that 
critical scrutiny is lacking in the assessments.  The IEO assessment found 
16 out of 22 assessments to highlight the participation process as one of the 
main strengths of the PRSP.  The IEO’s evaluation then goes on to point out 
some of the obvious country examples in which they feel that the Joint Staffs 
Assessment has been too lenient.  According to the evaluation unit the key 
reason why JSAs are insufﬁciently critical is because they tend to focus on 
who was consulted and how without giving much information on either the 
content of contributions or the impact.  When reviewing the 28 JSAs3 on their 
clear and candid assessment of the four key areas, each key area was assessed 
according to a four- criteria scale, assigning quality ratings to those key areas 
(Table 1).  
The clear and candid assessment of “Ownership and Participation” 
has received a median score of two, meaning that an “incomplete discussion 
of country ownership and participation” has taken place.  The mean score of 
2.43, although it is higher than the median, still tends to point more towards 
the direction of an incomplete discussion (category 2) of the topic than a good 
description (category 3) of the “Ownership and Participation”.  When com-
pared to the second key issue “Targets, Indicators and Monitoring” the dif-
ference between the two issues’ evaluation becomes painfully clear.  Whereas 
“Ownership and Participation” was rated “an incomplete discussion”, “Tar-
gets, indicators and Monitoring” is valued as in between a good description 
and some assessment (category 3) and a full description and good assessment 
(category 4).  The second key issue “Targets, Indicators and Monitoring” has 
however received the highest scores of all four key issues.  Nevertheless, even 
in comparison with the other two key issues, the clear and candid assessment 
of ownership and participation is rated substantially worse than the other key 
issues of the JSAs.  
3  A  desk-based  study  of  twenty-
eight  Joint  Staff  Assessments  of 
full PRSPs  was conducted.  OED 
(World  Bank)  reviewed  eleven  is-
sues, whereas IEO (IMF) reviewed 
an  additional  ﬁve  issues  not  han-
dled by the OED.  The Independent 
evaluation unit of the International 
Monetary Fund carried out the re-
view of the participation process.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06 • 11
Table 1:  OED’s Evaluation of the JSAs of participation processes
Clear and Candid Assessment of These Subsections Mean Median
A Ownership and Participation 2.43 2.00
1. Little or no description of participatory process and no discussion of ownership at all
2. Incomplete discussion of country ownership and participation
3. good description of participatory process and discussion of ownership
4.Extensive description of country ownership and participation and its impact on the content of the strategy.
B. Targets, Indicators and Monitoring 3.36 3.50
1.Partial description without assessment
2.Good description but no assessment
3.Good description and some assessment (1 or 2 criteria met)
4.Full description and good assessment (3 or 4 criteria met)
C. Priority Public Actions
C1 Macroeconomic Framework 3.04 3.00
C2.Fiscal Choices 3.14 3.00
C3. Financing Plan 2.79 3.00
Source: (IMF, 2004, p 97)
Based on the case studies and desk-based reviews mentioned above, 
both the IEO’s and the OED’s evaluation harshly criticize the current for-
mat of the JSAs.  Nevertheless, the arguments or analysis to back up these 
observations mentioned above were not included. We feel the evaluations of 
the JSAs lack the necessary transparency to go further into detail on one par-
ticular issue (participation), let alone falsify the analysis that has been made. 
Therefore we feel the elements mentioned above require further analysis.  As 
“Ownership and Participation” is rated the least clear and candid assessment 
we ﬁnd it necessary to dig a bit deeper, in order to complement the existing 
reviews with our own analysis. This paper will endeavour to be as transparent 
as possible in presenting our analysis and its results, clearly stating the nu-
merous constraints inevitably linked to this type of research.  It is important 
to retain that we will go into depth in the Joint Staff Assessments, not so much 
to ask ourselves which assessment is incompatible with the country reality, 
but rather we ask ourselves what can we learn about the depth and consistency 
of the evaluation and the possible reluctance of the evaluators to scrutinise the 
participation processes.  12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06
3  In-depth analysis of the Joint Staff Assessments
  of the participation processes in PRSPs
    Currently 40 countries have ﬁnished their Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers. The joint staff has already reviewed 37 of them4. There-
fore we have conducted our review based on the analysis of 35 joint staff 
assessments5(Annex1).  Each  staff  assessment  consists  of  four  paragraphs 
(participatory process, poverty diagnosis, monitoring and targets & indica-
tors and public priority actions) in which the various aspects of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper and its formulation process are evaluated. For rea-
sons explained above, this review will only focus on the evaluation of the 
participation process. 
3.1  Research Questions:
 
    In our analysis we will try to further analyse and clarify two 
criticisms made by the independent evaluations. Why do the same analysis 
over again? First, the scope of the analysis will be broadened up to 35 coun-
tries, whereas the independent evaluations had a more limited scope.6  More 
importantly, unlike the independent evaluations, we will try to present our 
analysis in such a way that it can be falsiﬁed by others. Furthermore, our only 
focus is the participation process. Hence, we will go more in-depth in this 
one particular issue, hoping to add new insights to the existing data. Distilled 
from the critiques of the independent evaluations we formulate three research 
questions.
A.  Are the design and the objectives of the evaluation of the
    participation process by the joint staff clear?
    First we will focus on the issue of the unclear nature of the as-
sessment by the joint staff. One could argue that in order to have a clear as-
sessment of a process ﬁrst of all the right questions should be asked. Therefore 
this will be our ﬁrst inquiry. “Are the right questions being asked?” Besides 
answering the right questions, one should expect these questions to all be 
answered in a consistent manner across all cases. In an ideal case, a checklist 
of criteria should be speciﬁed in advance. All countries’ JSAs should then be 
evaluated according to each of those criteria. If our review ﬁnds that these 
conditions of a clear evaluation (the right questions and a consistent manner 
of checking the answers on these questions across cases) are not fulﬁlled in 
the assessment of the joint staff, we can conclude that the joint staff assess-
ments lack clarity.         
B.  Do the assessments made by the joint staff lack candour?
     If so, why?
    The second assertion to tackle is the allegation that the JSAs 
are overly optimistic in their assessment, as expressed by the independent 
evaluations.  This is however a very difﬁcult hypothesis to test.  In order to 
4  Bhutan’s,  Bosnia  Herzegovina’s 
and  Serbia’s  PRSPs  have  thus  far 
not been reviewed. 
5 At the time we have started this 
review Djibouti’s JSA was not yet 
available,  which  brings  the  total 
available JSAs at thirty-six.   Ugan-
da’s Joint staff assessment was not 
considered  due  to  a  different  na-
ture  of  the  assessment  (Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper Progress 
Report Joint Staff Assessment).  
6 The  independent  evaluation  of 
the  IMF  Operations  Department 
has  included  22  countries.   The 
evaluation of OED presented a re-
view of 28 countries.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06 • 13
falsify this hypothesis, we should ﬁnd a discrepancy between the assess-
ment made by the joint staff and the reality of the participation process. 
Hence a variable quantifying the assessment made by the joint staff will 
be constructed. These ratings of JSAs should then be compared to the 
actual value of the participation process. We do however have no ratings 
of the real quality of the process. We will therefore reverse the reasoning.       
One could argue that certain basic socio-political conditions (basic liber-
ties, freedom of organization, of speech...) are conducive to participation 
processes. By contrasting the JSA scores with these indicators of the 
socio-political situation in a country, the absence of any relation between 
those variables could question the accuracy of the joint staff assessments.   
For, if both IFI’s agree with the fact that those basic socio-political con-
ditions are conducive to a participation process and we ﬁnd that there is 
no relation between those socio-political variables and the assessments 
of the participation processes made by the joint staff, this could suggest 
that something ﬁshy is going on.  
C.  Do these previous results (JSA score and the number of  
      criteria used) vary over time?
    Finally, the evolution of the critical nature and the analytical 
quality over time will be explored. These two questions will give us an 
idea of the possible changes in time regarding the JSAs.     
3.2  Joint Staff Assessments Variables:
   
    For conducting our analysis of the assessments of the par-
ticipation processes by the joint staff we have constructed a number of 
variables. These variables are all based on the information available in 
the Joint Staff Assessment documents. We have gathered all relevant in-
formation in one table, which can be provided on request. Below, a frag-
ment of the table is presented to clarify which information it contains. 
This table depicts ﬁve variables: 
A.  Date of the full PRSP:
    The second column states the date of submission of the full 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. This variable will be conducive to 
determining any variation in evaluations over time. When comparing 
different periods in time, these classiﬁcations will be based on the date 
of submission of the full PRSP. It would also have been possible to use 
the date of submission of the joint staff assessment. We have however 
opted to use the date of the submission of the PRSP, since this date is the 
closest date to the actual participation process. Although the participa-
tion process has taken place before this date, we will, because of data 
availability, treat the process as if it had taken place in the same year as 
the submission of the PRSP. Worth noting is the fact that the JSA usually 
is organized no more than a few months after the submission of the PRSP.   14 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06
Therefore it probably would not lead to very different results if the date of the 
JSA was used to demarcate time categories instead of the date of the submis-
sion of the full PRSP
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of the PRS 
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Positive aspects of the 
participation process
D.
Negative aspects of the participation process
Nepal 10/1/03 No 1 + this process 
of consultation 
demonstrates openness 
of the government to 
stakeholders’ feedback 
and concerns
-limited description of how poverty strategy has been 
modiﬁed as a result of the consultations
- intensiﬁcation of the security problem reduced the 
capacity of the government to engage wider civil 
society groups … the staff recommends reactivation 
and institutionalisation of mechanisms for continued 
participation
- translation in Nepali would be beneﬁcial for 
effective dissemination
B.  Participation mentioned as one of the strong points
    of the PRS Process
    The third column requires turning to the actual text of the as-
sessment. Almost every Joint Staff Assessment starts with a general overview 
in which the strong and the weak points of the strategy and the process are 
enumerated. Based on this general overview the question “Was the participa-
tion process explicitly mentioned as one of the strong points of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper’s elaboration process?” will be answered, thus cre-
ating a dichotomous variable (Yes/No). Thus the joint staff assessment did 
not explicitly mention the participation process as one of the main strengths 
of the PRSP in Nepal.  IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06 • 15
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B.  Participation mentioned as one of the strong points
    of the PRS Process
    The third column requires turning to the actual text of the as-
sessment. Almost every Joint Staff Assessment starts with a general overview 
in which the strong and the weak points of the strategy and the process are 
enumerated. Based on this general overview the question “Was the participa-
tion process explicitly mentioned as one of the strong points of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper’s elaboration process?” will be answered, thus cre-
ating a dichotomous variable (Yes/No). Thus the joint staff assessment did 
not explicitly mention the participation process as one of the main strengths 
of the PRSP in Nepal.  
C.  Quality of Participation process as perceived by
    the Joint Staff:
    In order to evaluate the candour of the JSAs, we need to compare 
the assessment made by the joint staff with a number of socio-political vari-
ables. Hence a rating of the assessment of the joint staff is needed. We will 
therefore attempt to translate the assessment made by the joint staff into a 
numerical variable. A ﬁve item-scale was constructed:
How did the Joint Staff evaluate the participation process in Country 
X? As being…
5 4 3 2 1
Good Moderate Poor
How was this 5-item scale created? First, we started by test-reviewing 
the assessments and categorizing them into three categories: poor, moderate 
and good.   While reviewing the JSAs we felt that there was another category 
needed to distinguish more accurately between the category “moderate” and 
the category “poor”. Therefore a score “2” was introduced. Basically this 
difference is based on the amount of criticism that is expressed by the joint 
staff, combined with a limited number of positive arguments or very vague 
arguments.  For example the JSAs of two countries can have been attributed 
the same (vague) positive arguments by the joint staff, but when they differ 
in the extent or severity of their criticisms, they should have a different score.     
Thus, roughly speaking, a JSA with a score “1” should have been either more 
heavily criticised or have less positive statements than a JSA rated “2”. The 
same line of reasoning holds for the difference between”2” &“3”and “3” & 
“4”. Crucial in the attribution of these scores is that the scores are not based on 
a simple subtraction of the number of negative arguments from the number 
of positive arguments, for not all criteria are equally vital to an acceptable 
participation process.  So weights should have been assigned to every crite-
rion to reﬂect the relative importance of this criterion for a good participation 
process. Thus far, to our knowledge, no such weighted checklist of criteria 
for participation processes is available. This is where the personal interpreta-
tion of the researcher comes in. In the example in Table 2, Nepal has been 
rated “poor”, thereby exemplifying a rather critical assessment of the JSA. 
This variable will be referred to as the JSA score. Ethiopia is an example of 
a JSA score 2. Whereas some genuine critiques were uttered concerning the 
participation process in Nepal (for example the security situation), the evalu-
ation of the participation process in Ethiopia was far more “vague”.  Few gen-
eral positive and negative remarks like “a broad-based participatory process” 
and “intention to further deepen the participatory process for implementa-
tion and monitoring” were made. Bolivia was rated  “moderate”, 3 on our 
5-item scale, since some negative comments were made alongside strengths 
that were explicitly mentioned (“vulnerable groups were well represented, 
speciﬁcally women and indigenous people”).  In our fourth category we ﬁnd 
countries like for example Rwanda, because the joint staff was very positive 
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(“good”) was created for the one assessment that stood out among the others. 
The assessment stated that various elements of the participation process  “in 
comparison to other countries” were “very advanced”. Only one country’ s 
evaluation (The Gambia) was attributed this score (Annex 1). 
D.  The positive and negative aspects of the participation process
    The two last columns of Table 2 list the arguments that we felt were 
used to discuss the quality of the participation process. The positive and respec-
tively the negative arguments are enumerated separately. From here on we will use 
the word “criterion” to denominate these arguments that have been extrapolated 
from the texts of the assessments. Although a criterion requires to be speciﬁed in 
advance as a factor that is going to be actively checked, this is not the case with 
these arguments.  As such, in our example of Nepal (Table 2) “this process of 
consultation demonstrates openness of the government to stakeholders’ feed-
back and concerns” is a positive criterion used by the JSA, whereas “transla-
tion in Nepali would be beneﬁcial for effective dissemination“ constitutes a 
negative criterion.
The above categorization was based on a rather arbitrary personal in-
terpretation of the positive and negative comments of the joint staff. Re-evalu-
ation of all JSAs by another scholar could have partly rectiﬁed this ﬂaw.  See-
ing it is a quite time-consuming endeavour to evaluate all JSAs, this remedy 
was not effectuated due to time constraints. We are aware that this shortcom-
ing seriously compels this research to temper the generalization of its ﬁnd-
ings. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd this exercise worthwhile, as it provides us with 
interesting, unavailable information on the depth, scope and consistency of 
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4.  Results
                                                                                                                              
    First we will take a look at the distribution of the variables we 
have constructed based on our JSA-reviews.  More speciﬁcally the distribu-
tion of both the “Participation process was explicitly mentioned as one of the 
strengths of the PRS”-variable and the “Quality of Participation process”-
variable is presented in the ﬁrst part. A second part  zooms in on the three 
research questions that were articulated in the previous part. For all three 
research questions the analysis is presented and the ﬁndings are interpreted. 
4.1  General Overview of the Findings
A.  Distribution of ‘Quality  of Participation Process
    As explained above, all JSAs are attributed a numerical score 
ranging from 1 to 5 as presented in the table below. The table shows the scores 
of the JSAs skewed towards the “poor” end of the continuum of assessing the 
participation process, with almost two-thirds of all JSAs rated below moder-
ate.   
Table 3:  Distribution of JSAs scores over the different categories: 
Category 5 = good 4   3 = moderate 2  1 = poor
Number of JSAs
N=35
1 3 8 18 5
Furthermore, the fact that the second category “2”, with 18 JSAs, is 
by far the largest group, seems to point in the direction of the ﬁndings of the 
World Bank and the IMF’s independent evaluations; namely that JSAs suffer 
from a lack of clarity and candid evaluation.  Those JSAs ﬁercely criticiz-
ing the participation process will not be found in this category.  Those types 
of JSAs will be found in the ﬁrst category “poor”.  On the other hand, the 
JSA that adulates the participation process in a particular country will not be 
found in this category either.  Therefore, this category will not accommodate 
very pronounced statements.   
B.  Distribution of “Participation process was explicitly
    mentioned as one of the strengths of the PRS”
    Let us now turn to the distribution of the second variable: “Is the 
participation process explicitly mentioned as one of the strong points of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’s elaboration process?”  As is portrayed 
in the table below 24 out of 35 assessments report the participation process to 
be one of the strong points. The more “poor” the JSA score becomes, the less 
the participation process is mentioned to be one of the main strengths of the 
PRSP, hence the difference in percentages towards the “poor” end of the con-
tinuum. This is what could be expected. However, not mentioning the partici-
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to be one of the weaknesses of the PRSP.  In some assessments, for example 
(Ghana, Burkina Faso) there was no mention of strong points whatsoever. 
This ﬁnding is similar to what the independent review of the IMF has 
found (16 out of 22 assessments mentioned the participation process to be one 
of the main strengths of the PRSP).  When almost seventy percent of all JSAs 
explicitly mention the participation process as one of the main strengths of 
the PRSP, this ﬁnding provides another picture of very positively evaluated 
participation processes.
Table 4:  JSAs scores and the number of times the participation process  
    was explicitly mentioned as one of the strengths of the PRS
Category 5 = good 4 3 = moderate 2 1 = poor
Number of Countries
N=35
1 3 8 18 5
Number of times the participation was 
explicitly mentioned as one of the strong 
points of the PRSP process
N= 24
1 3 7 12 1
% of all assessments that mentioned 
participation as one of the strong points 
in this category
100.0 100.0 87.5 66.7 20.0
4.2  Three Research Questions:
A.  Are the design and the objectives of the evaluation of
    the participation process by the joint staff clear?
    In this paragraph we will try to determine to what extent the cri-
tique put forward by the evaluations of both the World Bank and the IMF that 
the assessments of the joint staff are not clear, is correct?  What criteria are 
being used to assess the participation process?  Are they used in a consistent 
way on all the countries’ strategies?
What are the questions the Joint Staff Assessments should be
answering?  Do the JSAs provide a satisfactory answer?    
Guidelines were drawn up for the joint staff to evaluate the PRSPs 
by.  It is however very remarkable that these guidelines prescribe a thorough 
evaluation of the other three main sections (poverty diagnosis, targets & indi-
cators and priority public sanctions) but only require a description of the par-
ticipation process. This could be interpreted as a ﬁrst sign of the reluctance to 
critically scrutinise the participation process. This is clearly illustrated by the 
questions as they are prescribed in the JSA guidelines (Table 5). The ﬁrst two 
questions, rather than asking to evaluate the process, demand an evaluation of 
the description of the process. Whereas the guidelines ask for an evaluation 
of the PRS document with regard to the participation process, the questions 
related to the poverty diagnosis deﬁnitely demand an evaluation of the diag-
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explicitly ask for a candid evaluation of the participation process.  They only 
stipulate the need for a description of the process and a summary of the issues 
raised and the impact on the process.   
The last two questions (questions 3 & 4 Table5) concerning the evalua-
tion of the participation process are however not formulated as an evaluation 
of the document rather than the process, thus leave some room to evaluate 
these issues.  These issues are nevertheless of a far less “sensitive” nature.   
The reluctance to scrutinize the participation processes should however not 
come as a surprise.  The World Bank does not consider making political state-
ments as being part of their mandate (Piron & Evans, 2004). The review of a 
participation process however typically demands taking political factors into 
account. This combination will inevitably lead to “technising” political as-
sessment and being vaguely optimistic about the progress being made given 
the often difﬁcult circumstances.
Table 5:  The questions prescribed by the joint staff assessments






















1. Does the PRSP describe the participatory process that the 
government conducted to design and to build ownership for the strategy?
2. Does the PRSP summarize major issues raised during the 
participatory process and the impacts of the process on the content of the 
strategy? How has the participatory process evolved over time?
3. How closely is the PRSP related to any other current government 
documents that set forth national or sectoral development plans and/or 
budgets?

















s How adequate are existing poverty data?
To what extent have the growth and distributional impacts of past policies 
and programs been assessed?
Source: (World bank, s.d.)
Consequently one could conclude that a ﬁrst step in obtaining clear and 
candid answers out of the JSA process would be to ask the right questions.  If 
an evaluation of the participation processes is truly wanted then the guide-
lines should be altered into questions regarding the participation processes 
rather than the quality of its description in certain key documents.  This issue 
is inextricably linked to the fact that all PRSPs needed to be rated acceptable.   
If the participation processes themselves rather than their description were 
scrutinised, it would be even more difﬁcult to let them all be marked “accept-
able”.  Therefore in order to really alter these questions, the built-in bias to 
provide an approval should be tackled (Thomas, 2004).  Furthermore, in ac-
cordance with the critique of the independent evaluations, we found that not 
all of the questions in guidelines are consistently answered for all JSAs.
What are the evaluation criteria used by the Joint Staff to evaluate
the participation process?
A second dimension in determining to what extent it is clear how the 
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teria that were used. However, no explicit benchmarks or evaluation criteria 
were speciﬁed. Nor did the guidelines prescribe what criteria to use. Since 
no explicit criteria were mentioned, we have tried to extrapolate the criteria 
that were implicitly used, by listing the different arguments that were used to 
assess the participation process. A list of positive and negative criteria was 
made for every assessment. Table 6 shows the frequency with which the crite-
ria were used. At the positive arguments side, “Wide extensive participatory 
process” was used in 17 of the 35 cases. This sentence was almost used as a 
standard opening line, much like the assertion that participation was one of 
the strong points. A similar logic emerges from the negative criteria.  
The argument ‘Need for deepening and institutionalising the participa-
tion process’ was used ﬁfteen times. This argument is rather vague and very 
politically correct, since most participation processes, even the ones that have 
performed quite well can still improve the institutionalisation of the process.   
The second most frequently used critique is the ‘Need to enhance the role of 
parliamentarians’, which in our opinion is a much more clear, critical and 
veriﬁable criterion. At the other end of the frequency table we ﬁnd criteria 
like ‘time constraints’ and ‘Macro-economic issues were not discussed by all 
stakeholders’, issues that are nevertheless invoked time and again by both 
nongovernmental actors and recipient governments.     
Table 6:  Evaluation criteria:
Positively Evaluated Criteria Negatively Evaluated Criteria 
Wide extensive participatory process 17 Need for deepening and institutionalising the 
participation process
15
Document was approved by parliament 4 Need to enhance the role of parliamentarians 8
High responsiveness of government to 
stakeholders’ views
3 Need to further develop a participatory framework for 
the monitoring and evaluation of the PRSP
7
Good information dissemination 3 The poor were not sufﬁciently involved in the 
participation process
4
Availability in local languages 3 Government experienced capacity constraints 3
Inclusion of women in the process 3 Women’s participation was not adequate 3
Good partnership with ngos 2 Participation of people from rural/ remote areas was 
limited
3
Participation is being institutionalised 2 Capacity constraints faced all relevant players 2
Inclusion of political parties 1 Problems with translation of documents 2
Participation also in discussion of macro 
economic issues
1 Limited capacity of civil society 2
Inclusion of ethnic groups 1 Limited inclusion of cross-cutting issues as for example 
gender
2
Inclusion of local authorities 1 Skepticism among population 1
Participation as joint decision making 1 Problems with security Situation 1
Reaching the poor 1 Time constraints 1
Inclusion of participants across the political 
spectrum
1 Macro-economic issues were not discussed by all 
stakeholders
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To be able to assess more accurately which criteria were used to evalu-
ate the participation process and to ﬁnd out what the main obstacles and suc-
cesses were, we have listed 99 out of 147 arguments used to evaluate the proc-
ess either positively or in a negative way.7Although some of these arguments 
as well as their label as either positive or negative criteria are debatable and 
not uniformly assessed by academia (for example the inclusion of political 
parties as a positive or negative criteria), we feel it would be possible to com-
pile a list of criteria to be systematically checked for each PRSP.  Based on the 
scheme below, provided by the PRSP Sourcebook’s chapter on participation, 
it would not be impossible to construct a rudimentary checklist of criteria 
to use in order to evaluate the participation process. This checklist should 
encompass criteria assessing the extent to which different stakeholder groups 
(Figure 1) were involved as well as regarding the mechanisms of participation 
(Figure 1). The different dimensions of participation (information sharing, 
consultation, joint-decision making etc.) should also be incorporated. Fur-
thermore, the PRSP Sourcebook’s chapter on participation makes a list of the 
key inputs they recommend when designing a participatory process; included 
are for example a public information strategy, national workshops, participa-
tory choice of antipoverty actions, preparation of alternative PRSPs or policy 
proposals. These criteria have been mentioned occasionally in the JSAs but 
were never consistently checked for all JSAs. Compiling such a checklist of 
criteria is nevertheless not in the line of this paper, since this would require 
an extensive review of all literature regarding participation processes and as 
such constitute a whole new research question.  
Figure 1: Participation in Government Processes
Source: World Bank, 2003, p238.
    
7 In 9 out of the 35 JSAs relative 
criteria  were  used  (Albania,  Az-
erbaijan, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Malawi,  Mauritania,  Mozambique 
and Niger).  In reality this means 
that the assessment was based on 
the starting position of the coun-
try.  For example, in the Albanian 
review the joint staff states, “given 
Albania’s  history,  the  government 
was open to public participation”. 
Two remarks should be made con-
cerning these relative criteria.  
First, the use of relative statements 
seems to point in the direction of 
the ﬁndings of the World Bank and 
the IMF’s evaluations; namely that 
JSAs suffer from a lack of clarity and 
candid  evaluation.  These  relative 
statements  could  easily  obscure 
the weaknesses of a participation 
process  by  concentrating  on  the 
fact that “given the circumstances” 
the actual participation was quite 
an  achievement.  This  loophole 
could explain why this “fuzzy” type 
of assessment is used nine times.   It 
would be very interesting to relate 
these  relative  assessments  with 
measures of change over time.  If, as 
stated in the Albanian JSA, the par-
ticipation has induced an openness 
that  is  considerable  when  com-
pared to the openness before this 
process, this should be reﬂected in 
the change in variables like “voice 
and  participation”.    However  the 
availability of recent data and the 
fact that most PRSPs are still recent 
inhibits this kind of research; com-
paring  variables  before  and  after 
the participation process.  
Secondly, these relative statements 
pose  a  problem.    Relative  state-
ments cannot be compared or cor-
related  with  absolute  statements.   
Seeing that it is only applicable on 
nine arguments (out of a total of 
147), these relative arguments will 
be  omitted  as  either  positive  or 
negative  criteria.    Moreover,  we 
will attempt not to let our rating 
be inﬂuenced by those arguments.   
Thus only absolute criteria are to 
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• Participatory research, e.g., perceptions of the poor
• Consultations – informal and structured
• Formation of Committees and working groups
• Integration with political processes
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Returning to our research questions, there is not only an important 
difference in the amount of times certain arguments are used to rate a partici-
pation process as successful on the aggregate level (for example “document 
approved by parliament” was mentioned 4 times), there is also a substantial 
variation in the number of criteria used in each JSA.  
As is depicted in the graph below, the number of criteria used, varies 
between two and ten. The average number of criteria used per JSA is 4.54 
criteria, including both positive and negative criteria. In forty percent of all 
JSAs no more than three criteria are used to evaluate the participation process, 
whereas in 14.3 percent of the cases eight criteria or more are listed.  Using 
the number of criteria per JSA as a proxy for analytical quality, these ﬁnding 
quantify the criticism of the independent evaluations, namely that there are 
larges differences in analytical quality between assessments. If some coun-
tries are assessed on a mere two criteria, others are screened more thoroughly 
by checking up to ten criteria. Hence, the clarity of the procedure might be 
enhanced as an equal number of explicitly mentioned criteria were to be ana-
lyzed for all JSAs alike.













2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
The evaluations of both IMF and World Bank highlighted the need for 
clearer evaluations and the possible use of benchmarks to systematize the as-
sessments.  Our analysis of the criteria used by the joint staffs tends to agree 
with the critiques made by those evaluations.  Using some of the criteria listed 
as a checklist and evaluating those in a same manner for all PRSPs could ad-
dress the need for a clearer evaluation.     
Frequency of the number of criteria used per JSA
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B.  Do the assessments made by the joint staff lack candour?
    If so, why?
    A second question that needs to be veriﬁed is the question with 
regard to the candid nature of the assessments.  As expressed by the inde-
pendent evaluations the built-in bias of reaching an “acceptable strategy” as 
an answer, can prevent criticism. Not one assessment of the full PRSPs up 
until now has been rated “not acceptable”.  Are the strategies and speciﬁcally 
the participation processes indeed all acceptable or do the joint staffs mask 
their shortcomings? One way to ﬁnd out is to correlate the evaluations with 
certain socio-political indicators, approved or even constructed by the World 
Bank itself, and test the consistency of the assessments with those indicators.     
We will gauge the relation between our joint staff assessment scores and suc-
cessively “civil liberties”, “political rights” and the “voice and accountabil-
ity” of the respective recipient countries. We will conduct our research based 
on the underlying assumption that in reality there is a relation between the 
strength of some basic socio-political variables like “civil liberties”, “politi-
cal rights” and “voice& accountability” on the one hand and the quality of 
participation processes possible on the other hand. Various scholars endorse 
this assumption. Elberlei (2001) acknowledges that institutionalised partici-
pation needs basic political rights as well as speciﬁc rights of participation 
within the concrete PRS context. He enumerates basic rights like freedom 
of opinion, information, media and association as examples of rights crucial 
to participation. Furthermore, political structures are considered equally im-
portant for dialogue between all stakeholders both at the regional and at the 
local level. Competences and rights need to be clearly stated.  An open infor-
mation policy of the government, which allows a comprehensive insight into 
the implementation of the PRSP is considered conducive to participation as 
well (Elberlei, 2001).  The issues raised above are captured by the variables 
“civil rights”, “political rights” and “voice and participation”, the socio-politi-
cal variables that will be used in our analysis.  We do not pretend to be able to 
predict how strong this theorized relation should be.  We do however feel that 
the absence of any relation would be a remarkable ﬁnding. The lack of any 
relation between those respective ratings and the evaluations of the joint staff 
will indeed therefore lead us to conclude that the candour of the assessments 
could be questioned. 
Relation between the strength of the participation process and
the civil liberties and political rights:
We now turn to the possible relation between the civil liberties be-
stowed upon individuals of a country and the JSA appraisal of its participation 
processes. The logic behind this analysis is the link between the JSA score 
and some basic conditions in order to assess a participation process as being 
‘acceptable’. A ﬁrst condition, which needs to be fulﬁlled, is a basic level of 
civil liberties. We shall use the deﬁnition put forward by Freedom House: 24 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06
Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associa-
tional and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without 
interference from the state. (Freedom house, 2004)
Freedom house is a very highly valued data source, which is illustrated 
by the huge amount of studies, including those of the World Bank, using their 
indices of freedom as indicators. Freedom house assesses the civil liberties of 
192 countries by attributing each of them a score between 1 and 7, with 1 rep-
resenting high civil liberties and 7 very restricted civil liberties.  One would 
expect, in accordance with Elberlei’s assertions, to ﬁnd a substantial negative 
relationship between those two variables, because when civil liberties are 
very minimal (a high score on Freedom house civil liberties) the participation 
process will suffer from this lack of freedom of expression, organisation (a 
low score on the JSAs).  However the Kendall’s rank correlation coefﬁcient8 
of “ civil liberties” freedom house index and JSA score on participation proc-
ess is -0.057.  This does not represent a strong association between these two 
variables. On the contrary, this ﬁnding suggests there is no relation between 
both variables, thereby corroborating the ﬁndings of the independent evalu-
ations.  
Furthermore, the scatter plot does not seem to suggest a relation be-
tween the JSA score and the “civil liberties” in that country either.  As stated 
above we do not pretend to know how strong the theorised relation between 
civil liberties and the quality of participation processes should be, but the 
clear absence of any relation constitutes a remarkable ﬁnding.



























A second indicator compiled by Freedom house is the index of “politi-
cal rights”.  Political rights are deﬁned as:
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political proc-
ess. This includes the right to vote and compete for public ofﬁce and to elect 
representatives who have a decisive vote on public policies. (Freedom house, 
2004)
8 The Kendall’s rank correlation co-
efﬁcient is a a rank correlation co-
efﬁcient used when both variables 
represent ordinal data in a limited 
number of grades, such as in our 
research  for  example  the  catego-
ries poor, moderate, and good, so 
that  multiple  samples  can  be  as-
signed to each grade.  The Kendall 
‘s rank correlation coefﬁcient varies 
between +1 (perfect positive asso-
ciation) and -1 (perfect negative as-
sociation).  A correlation coefﬁcient 
of zero means that there is no rela-
tionship between the variables.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06 • 25
The political rights index attributes a score to each country on a scale 
from 1 to 7, with 7 representing the most restricted political rights.  The same 
line of reasoning as with the civil liberties holds also for the political rights.   
A negative relation is to be expected based on our underlying assumption 
that political rights are conducive to the quality of the participation processes.   
However no relation is found between the JSAs scores and the political rights 
index (Kendall rank correlation coefﬁcient = -0.033). The scatter plot does 
not seem to suggest an association between those two variables either.

























 A third index is used by Freedom house to indicate the level of free-
dom citizens in a speciﬁc country enjoy; the composite index. This index is 
constructed as a non-weighted average of the two separate indices (political 
rights and civil liberties).  Ranging from 1 to 7, countries are considered to 
be free (average from 1- 2.5 = F), partly free (average from 3-5.5 =PF) or not 
free (average from 5.5 to 7 = NF).  When distributing the different freedom 
house categories among the various JSA categories, a much-dispersed image 
is obtained. We would expect that the “Free” countries would be at the “good 
“ end of the JSA score scale, while ﬁnding more “Not Free” countries at the 
“poor” end of the continuum.  Surprisingly, the highest score of the JSA scores 
(score = 5) is rated “Not Free”.  Moreover, 75 percent of the JSAs of the two 
highest categories (score = 4 or 5) are rated ”Not Free”.  Furthermore only 
one of the lowest category (score=1) JSA scores is a “Not Free” country.  This 
table shows that no clear relation is to be detected between the JSA scores and 
the Freedom House composite index.
Table 8:  Distribution of composite freedom house index over the ﬁve  
    JSA assessments categories9
Category 5 = good 4 3 = inadequate 2 1 = poor
N= 35 1 3 8 18 5
NF=1 NF=2 NF= 2 NF=6 NF=1
PF= / PF = 5 PF=9 PF=2
F=1 F= 1 F=3 F=2
9 Freedom house Ratings 2002 F= 
Free= 7; Benin, Bolivia, Ghana, Guy-
ana, Honduras, Mali, Mongolia PF= 
Partly  Free=  16; Albania, Azerbai-
jan, Armenia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, 
Georgia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mo-
zambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Tanzania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Zambia 
NF=  Not  Free=  12;  Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Guinea, 
Kyrgyz  Republic,  Mauritania,  Paki-
stan, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Yemen, Viet-
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The results, the rank correlation coefﬁcients as well as the scatter plots 
and the table, do not indicate a relation in either direction between the strength 
of the participation process and the freedom index of the country.  Given the 
assumption based on Elberlei and other scholars, these ﬁndings seem to sug-
gest a discrepancy between the evaluations made by the joint staff and what is 
the actual reality of the country, as it is measured by these indices.
Relation between the strength of the participation process and
“voice and accountability”: (World Bank Governance Indicators)
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) constructed as a World Bank 
Research Paper a database on governance. The governance indicator they 
constructed consists of six sub dimensions. One of those sub dimensions is 
‘voice and accountability”. Voice and accountability as deﬁned by the World 
Bank is “ the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in 
the selection of governments.” The World Bank ﬁnds it necessary for civil so-
ciety and civilians in recipient countries to have sufﬁcient ‘voice’ not only to 
inﬂuence the selection of governments but also to actively co-construct their 
national poverty reduction strategies. As mentioned above, the participation 
logic derives from this assertion that country ownership is crucial to enhance 
the effectiveness of development aid. To reach this country ownership a large 
scale participation of civil society should take place. When lacking voice, no 
genuine participation is possible. Therefore a minimum standard of voice 
could be seen as a necessary condition for genuine participation processes.
This indicator is a composite index of seven representative data sources10 
and six unrepresentative data sources.  One of the six representative sources 
is the Freedom house index used in the analysis above.  However, the combi-
nation with the other eleven databases does constitute a new variable and thus 
worth analysing the relation of the strength of the participation process and 
“voice and accountability”. We would expect to ﬁnd a strong positive correla-
tion coefﬁcient since more voice and accountability (score ranging from -2.5 
to + 2.5) in a country should be conducive to the quality of the participation 
process (score ranging from 1 to 5)
10 The seven representative sources 
are:  Columbia  University  (State 
Capacity Project), Economist Intel-
ligence Unit (Country Risk Service), 
Freedom House (Freedom in the 
World),  State  Department  / Am-
nesty International (Human Rights 
Report), Political Risk Services (In-
ternational  Country  Risk  Guide), 
Reporters Without Borders, World 
Markets Research Center (World 
Markets  Online).The  six  non-rep-
resentative  sources  are:    Afroba-
rometer  Survey,  Freedom  House 
(Nations  in Transition),  Gallup  In-
ternational  (Voice  of  the  People 
Survey), World  Economic  Forum 
(Global  Competitiveness  Report), 
Latinobarometro  Surveys  en  Insti-
tute  for  Management  and  Devel-
opment  (World  Competitiveness 
Yearbook).
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The Kendall rank correlation coefﬁcient of the Joint Staff Assessments 
scores and the “voice and accountability” variable is  -0.037.  This coefﬁcient 
refutes the possibility of a strong, positive relation between the two variables.     
In addition, the table does not contradict the lack of relation between the two 
variables. The lack of a clear positive relation between these two variables 
does seem to endorse the thesis that the assessments could be lacking candour, 
since there is no consistency between the “voice”- variable, which is compiled 
by the World Bank itself, and the assessments made by its joint staff, although 
theory predicts a positive relation between these two variables.
C.  Do these previous results (JSA score and the number of
    criteria used) vary over time?
    A ﬁnal question we wish to embark upon is the time dimension 
in the critiques made towards the joint staff assessments.  More speciﬁcally, 
two questions will be answered; First, do the assessments of the participa-
tion processes tend to become more critical over time or rather the opposite?   
Secondly, are the more recent assessments more nuanced, meaning that more 
criteria are being taken into consideration?      
Did the assessments become more critical over time?
Various hypotheses could come to mind when theorizing about the pos-
sible changes of the nature of the Joint Staff Assessments over time.  Two 
possible hypotheses will be presented brieﬂy before analysing the data.  We 
do however not pretend to provide an exhaustive overview of all possible hy-
potheses concerning this issue. A ﬁrst evolution that could be expected is an 
evolution on the part of the staff. The staff of both World Bank and IMF is not 
completely isolated from outside critiques and input.  It would be possible that 
being confronted with criticism from international ngo’s, donor agencies as 
well as from academia, renders the evaluators more critical.  If this hypothesis 
were true, all else being equal, the JSA scores should become lower over time, 
since the evaluators are less lenient. The table below shows an accumulation 
of poverty reduction strategy papers in 2002 and 2003.  Only one staff assess-
ment was available from 2004 at the time we started with this analysis. With a 
view to evaluating the evolution in time of the JSA scores, the average scores 
for each year were calculated. 
Table 10:  The JSAs score differentiated according to the date of the   
    joint staff assessments
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 200411
Number of PRSPs 2 4 14 14 1
Average score 2.00 2.75 2.79 2.21 1.00
The table does not present a clear pattern of a decrease in JSA scores 
over time. The evolution depicted in the table shows a steady rising of the JSA 
scores, respectively 2.00 in 2000, 2.75 in 2001 and 2.79 in 2003.  In 2003 the 
average JSA score falls back to 2.21. Therefore we shall conclude there is no 
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evidence suggesting a change in the evaluation scores as suggested by the 
hypothesis of the evolution of the attitude of the staff.  
A second hypothesis worth taking a look at is that of the millennium 
rush. Time cannot only bring about changes on the staff-side, but timing 
could also play a crucial role in the type of countries applying for the PRS-
process.  Could it be possible that at certain periods countries less ﬁt for PRSP 
participation processes applied systematically more than in other periods?   
One possible explanation could be the millennium rush. This Millennium 
rush hypothesis has been put forward in the context of the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). The hypothesis states that there was in-
creased ﬂexibility of the implementation of this initiative at the beginning of 
the new millennium. Between 1996 and 1999 only seven countries became 
eligible for debt relief under the Original HIPC Initiative (O-HIPC). However, 
when approaching the turn of the millennium, pressure from international 
NGO-networks  intensiﬁed.  The  pressure  from  these  global  ngo-networks 
combined with the impatience of the Development Committee, resulted in 
an Enhanced HIPC initiative, in which a clear relation with Poverty Reduc-
tion and debt reduction was made, as well as extending the list of countries 
that were eligible to embark upon this process. The World Bank and IMF 
promised to bring at least 20 countries to decision point by December 2000,in 
which they succeeded (22 countries by 27 December 2000). Based on this 
information it could well be possible that the ﬁrst group of countries, the 
ones that were going to be admitted to start with the HIPC-process, have 
distinct characteristics from those countries forced into the process under 
considerable pressure. Although this hypothesis originated in the context of 
the HIPC debt relief and not within the context of PRSP and its participation 
conditionality as such, it might be interesting to check its relevance for the 
PRSP.  In order to verify this hypothesis, we have constructed three groups, 
based on the HIPC status under which they have achieved decision point. A 
ﬁrst group encloses all countries that were selected by the IFI’s to participate 
under the original HIPC scheme. These countries are Bolivia, Burkina Faso, 
Mozambique, Uganda, Guyana, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire.  Since Côte d’Ivoire 
has not prepared a PRSP document, given that it reached decision point under 
the original framework, it will be not be included in our analysis. Uganda is 
not included in our research sample either. This group of ﬁve countries will 
be identiﬁed as “pre-millennium rush”. The second group holds those coun-
tries that were in fact admitted under the enhanced framework before the end 
of 2000 (millennium rush group). This group consists of fourteen countries: 
Mauritania, Benin, Cameroon, The Gambia, Guinea, Honduras, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal and Zambia. The third group consists 
of all other countries (“post millennium rush”).  
In order to corroborate this hypothesis, our analysis of the JSA scores, 
divided according to those three groups, should show a high average JSA 
score for the ﬁrst group, followed by a low score in the second group. What to 
expect of the third group based on this hypothesis is not completely clear.  
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Table 11:  JSA score differentiated over time
Period Pre-Millennium Rush Millennium Rush Post-Millennium Rush
N= 35 5 14 16
Average JSA score 2.4 3.0 2.0
Average FH civil lib 3.2 4.14 4.75
Average FH pol rights 2.4 4.43 4.69
 
The average JSA scores do not conﬁrm the hypothesis of the millen-
nium rush. In fact the average scores, which should have been higher for the 
pre-millennium rush group than for the millennium group according to the 
hypothesis, are exactly the opposite of what was expected. The millennium 
rush group has a higher average JSA score (3.0) than those countries, which 
were admitted under the original HIPC framework (2.4). However, both the 
scores of the Freedom House civil liberties and the political rights conﬁrm the 
millennium rush hypothesis. On a seven-item scale, with seven representing 
the least civil liberties and political rights, the pre-millennium group is rated 
better than its millennium rush counterpart. Thus, although the pre-millenni-
um group scores better on both political rights and civil liberties, as measured 
by Freedom House, the average JSA scores present us with a reversed image.   
This ﬁnding is a remarkable one. 
Did the assessments become more nuanced over time?
The number of criteria used could serve as a proxy for the analytical 
quality of the Joint Staff Assessments.  As one of the criticisms was the varia-
tion in analytical quality among the JSAs, it would be interesting to ﬁnd out if 
there has been any improvement in this respect over the last few years. Con-
sequently we have calculated the average number of criteria per assessment 
used to describe the participation process (“more nuance”) for each of the ﬁve 
years.  The results are depicted in the table below:
Table 12:  The number of evaluation criteria used and the date of
    joint staff assessments:
Year 2000&2001 2002 2003 & 2004
N= 35 2 + 4 14 14 + 1
Average number of criteria used to
asses the participation process
4.83 4.36 4.60
Since there is only one observation of the year 2004 and only two in 
2000, we will not consider these observations to be representative averages 
for the respective years. Therefore we have opted to add the observations of 
the year 2000 to those of 2001 and the one observation of 2004 to those of the 
year 2003. These results seem to suggest no substantial change in the number 
of criteria used to assess the participation over time. The analytical quality 
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5.  Conclusion
     This paper started by presenting the critiques formulated by the 
independent reviews of both the World Bank and the IMF.  The purpose of 
this analysis was to verify the critiques uttered by those evaluations and to 
deepen the analysis.  We found that the allegations of the reviews  were not 
contradicted by our analysis, in fact our ﬁndings seem to corroborate those 
critiques. The main ﬁndings and the main reasons for these shortcomings are 
summarised in what follows.
In order to provide a clear appraisal system, one of the ﬁrst prerequi-
sites should be a number of questions that correspond to the information you 
wish to obtain.  This is not the case with the Joint Staff Assessments.  While 
the independent evaluations criticize the lack of clarity and candid assess-
ments, they should start by denouncing asking the wrong questions.  There-
fore, instead of evaluating the description of the process in the document, the 
participation processes themselves should be evaluated.  
Moreover, besides asking the right questions, you should try answering 
in such a way that they are clear, veriﬁable and comparable among each other.   
Our analysis of the criteria implicitly used by the JSAs, ﬁnds that such clarity 
is lacking.  Both the deﬁciency of clear benchmarks to assess the participa-
tion process, as well as the inconsistent manner of checking criteria (criteria 
used per country range from 2 to 10) contribute to the fuzziness and possi-
ble euphemisms that are instrumental in rating all PRSPs as acceptable.  As 
became clear from the criteria listed in Table 6, the fuzziest arguments were 
the most frequently used.  If the link between the joint staff assessments and 
the acceptation of the PRSP by the IFIs was dissolved or at least lessened, a 
more critical review might be possible, in which some clear criteria, which 
are publicly available, are used as benchmarks and checked with all countries’ 
PRSPs in the same way. 
This review also found the lack of any relation between basic socio-po-
litical variables, which are stated to be conducive to participation processes 
by various scholars and the actual assessments of those processes, remarkable.   
We feel that these ﬁndings can be interpreted as an indication supporting the 
theses of the independent evaluations; namely the assertion that assessments 
are not candid because of the need to provide a positive answer, even for those 
countries that do not allow their citizens some of the basic civil liberties, po-
litical rights or a climate conducive to a minimum of voice and accountability.   
Once again, the cause of the caution of the joint staff can be found in the con-
stellation of the IFIs’ conception of their mandate.  How can one thoroughly 
scrutinise a participation process, whithout becoming “political”?
Finally, the evolution in time of these previous factors was analyzed.   
Neither did the evolution in time of the average JSA-score corroborate nor 
the “learning by the joint staff”- hypothesis, nor did it seem to endorse the 
“millennium rush”- hypothesis.  Moreover, the number of criteria used in each 
joint staff assessments (as a proxy for analytical quality) on average remained 
more or less constant when diversiﬁed over the different years.IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2005-06 • 31
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  Annex 1:
  Date of submission of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers  
    and date of elaboration of Joint Staff Assessments.*
Country PRSP Joint Staff Assessment
1  Albania 2/21/02 6/20/02
2  Armenia 11/20/03 12/2/03
3  Azerbaijan 5/14/03 5/29/03
4  Benin 3/6/03 4/29/03
5  Bhutan 8/11/04 /
6  Bosnia Herzegovina 3/1/04 /
7  Bolivia 3/1/01 5/10/01
8  Burkina Faso 5/25/00 6/7/00
9  Cambodia 1/29/03 1/23/03
10  Cameroon 8/12/03 8/29/03
11  Chad 7/17/03 10/6/03
12  Djibouti 3/31/04 5/12/04
13  Ethiopia 10/9/02 10/9/02
14  Georgia 8/27/03 11/7/03
15  Ghana 3/6/03 5/19/03
16  Guinea 7/17/02 8/23/02
17  Guyana 5/3/02 10/31/02
18  Honduras 9/27/01 10/15/01
19  Kyrgyz Republic 1/23/03 2/26/03
20  Madagascar 10/17/03 10/22/03
21  Malawi 8/6/02 8/30/02
22  Mali 2/27/03 3/11/03
23  Mauritania 12/13/00 5/15/01
24  Mongolia 9/3/03 9/22/03
25  Mozambique 10/1/01 10/1/01
26  Nepal 10/1/03 11/21/03
27  Nicaragua 9/13/01 9/19/01
28  Niger 1/31/02 2/12/02
29  Pakistan 2/9/04 2/12/04
30  Rwanda 7/31/02 8/9/02
31  Senegal 11/20/02 1/31/03
32  Serbia and Montenegro 2/18/04 /
33  Sri Lanka 2/26/03 4/22/03
34  Tajikistan 10/10/02 12/16/02
35  Tanzania 10/1/00 11/2/00
36  The Gambia 7/10/02 7/18/02
37  Uganda 3/24/00 3/9/01
38  Vietnam 5/31/02 3/8/04
39  Yemen 7/23/02 8/23/02
40  Zambia 5/16/02 5/23/02
Source: (World bank, 2004)
* The highlighted countries are not 
included in our deskbased analysis.